DNA Typing: A New Investigatory Tool by Tande, Clare M.
DNA TYPING: A NEW INVESTIGATORY TOOL
INTRODUCTION
Experts describe DNA typingl-a test used to identify persons
based on the genetic code found in their DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)-
as "the most significant break through in resolving serious crime since
fingerprinting was invented."'2 Because all of a person's cells carry the
same DNA, and each person's DNA is unique (except in the case of
identical twins), DNA typing can identify people with "near-perfect
accuracy."'3
A recent English case, Regina v. Pitchfork 4 vividly illustrates DNA
typing's tremendous potential as an investigatory tool. In 1983, a teen-
age girl was raped and murdered near the village of Enderby. The police
were unable to find the murderer. Three years later, another girl was
raped and murdered near the same village. Authorities took DNA prints
from the semen found on her body and discovered they matched those
taken from the first victim, thus indicating that the same person had
committed both crimes. The police then arrested a seventeen-year-old
and subjected a sample of his blood to DNA typing. The suspect's DNA
prints did not match those found on the victims, however, and the police
subsequently released him.
The police then asked all men in the area between thirteen and
thirty to voluntarily provide blood samples for DNA typing. Approxi-
mately fifty-five hundred men, all but two in the area, complied with the
request. One local resident, Colin Pitchfork, was eventually arrested and
convicted of the crimes, after a friend admitted he had supplied Pitch-
fork's sample by using false identification.
1. See infra notes 29-52 and accompanying text.
2. Marshall, "Genetic Fingerprints" May Catch Killer, L.A. Times, March 11, 1987, at 11, col.
4. See also Spencer v. Virginia, Nos. 881268, 881288 (Va. Sept. 22, 1989) (1989 WL 109529,
109530) (first state supreme court to rule on admissibility of DNA identification in criminal case;
held DNA print evidence properly admitted to link defendant to murder victim); Andrews v. State,
533 So. 2d 841, 842-43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (first appellate court to rule on admissibility of
DNA identification in criminal cases held DNA print identification evidence properly admitted to tie
defendant to remaining body fluids on rape victim).
3. Begley, Leaving Holmes in the Dust, Newsweek, Oct. 26, 1987, at 81.
4. See White & Greenwood, DNA Fingerprinting and the Law, 51 MOD. L. REv. 145, 149-50
(1988); see also Regina v. Pitchfork, The Times, Jan. 23, 1988, at col. 1 (Leicester Crown Court Jan.
22, 1988) (new forensic technique of DNA fingerprinting used to "crack" the English case); Begley,
supra note 3, at 81 (initial suspect in English case released because DNA pattern did not match
evidence from crime); DNA Prints, Time, Jan. 26, 1987, at 66; Marshall, supra note 2, at 11, cols. 4-5
(English police connected the deaths of two victims 2 1/2 years apart through DNA fingerprinting).
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The Pitchfork case demonstrates the power of DNA typing as an
investigatory tool. By using DNA typing in their investigation, English
law enforcement authorities not only exculpated an innocent man, but
also apprehended the true murderer when all other leads proved useless.
In the United States, however, the federal Constitution presumably
would prohibit authorities from testing a whole community like En-
derby. Because the Supreme Court has classified the taking of blood
samples for testing as a search and seizure under the fourth amendment, 5
police can take samples only after obtaining a warrant based on a show-
ing of probable cause. 6 The English police clearly could not have shown
probable cause to obtain a warrant for all fifty-five hundred men. More-
over, a United States court probably would decline to find that the fifty-
five hundred men waived their fourth amendment rights7 by "volunta-
rily" submitting to the mass testing. Although the British police asserted
the testing was voluntary, the social pressure to submit to testing, and the
resulting suspicion cast on anyone who refused, most likely would con-
vince United States courts that the testing was not voluntary.8 Without
probable cause or voluntary action, United States law enforcement au-
thorities could not have implemented such a program.
However, United States authorities may be able to use DNA typing
as an investigatory tool on a limited scale. Frequently, identification
techniques like DNA typing are most helpful when police lack probable
cause to arrest. Police might be able to use DNA typing to both incul-
pate and exculpate if they could type the forensic samples of hair, blood,
saliva, semen, and skin discovered at the scene of a crime and compare
5. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966); see also Note, Analyzing the Reasona-
bleness of Bodily Intrusions, 68 MARQ. L. REV. 130, 133-34 (1984) (courts focus on evidence, de-
fendant's privacy right, society's interest in criminal prosecution, and invasive procedures used to
determine reasonableness of intrusion).
6. See Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441 (1925) ("Probable cause has been defined
by this Court as 'reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the party is guilty of the offense with which
he is charged.' "); see also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.2 (1978) (discussing several tests and definitions of probable cause); Note, Deten-
tion to Obtain Physical Evidence Without Probable Cause: Proposed Rule 41.1 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 712, 712 (1972) (police must have probable cause to believe
that the suspect committed the crime).
7. The intense peer pressure to comply with the testing could be seen as sufficiently coercive as
to negate consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228 (1973) ("But the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendment requires that a consent not be coerced, by explicit or implicit means, by
implied threat or covert force. For, no matter how subtlely the coercion was applied, the resulting
'consent' would be no more than a pretext for the unjustified police intrusion .... ").
8. See Marshall, supra note 2, at 13, cal. 2 (discussing local men's reservations about testing
and the "atypical social pressure" of close-knit middle-class villagers to comply).
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them to the DNA prints of suspects.9 In cases where a forensic sample is
the only evidence that police discover, an arguably strong state interest in
DNA typing exists. On the other hand, individuals greatly value the pri-
vacy from state intrusion protected by the fourth amendment. 10 In light
of the unprecedented reliability of DNA typing, the law must find new
ways to balance law enforcement's interest in crime investigation with
individuals' fourth amendment right to privacy.' 1
The Supreme Court suggested a new approach to this dilemma in
Davis v. Mississippi. 12 In this case the Court proposed in dictum that the
Constitution may allow a magistrate to authorize police to detain briefly
a suspect for fingerprinting, another highly reliable identification tech-
nique, without showing probable cause. 13 Based on this dictum, the
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
41.1.14 The proposed rule authorizes magistrates to order criminal sus-
pects to submit to nontestimonial identification procedures on less than
probable cause. 15 The rule permits the following identification proce-
dures: "identification by fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measure-
ments, blood specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples, hair samples,
or other reasonable physical or medical examination, handwriting exem-
plars, voice samples, photographs, and lineups."' 6 This group of identifi-
cation procedures presumably would include taking samples for DNA
typing. Although the Judicial Conference did not ultimately approve the
9. See White & Greenwood, supra note 4, at 149 (DNA typing's potential to establish inno-
cence is no less important than its potential to incriminate).
10. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966) ("The interests in human dignity
and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid any such [blood testing] intrusions on the
mere chance that desired evidence might be obtained.").
11. See Note, The Constitutionality of Compulsory Identification Procedures on Less than Prob.
able Cause: Reassessing the Davis Dictum, 89 DicK. L. REV. 501, 501-02 (1985) ("To resolve the
conflict between the police need and the individual's rights, a court must determine at what point a
suspect is sufficiently connected to the commission of a crime that the public interest in solving that
crime justifies subjecting him to the procedure against his will.").
12. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
13. Id. at 727.
14. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States,
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Fed. Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United
States Dist. Court and the Fed. Rules of Appellate Procedure, 52 F.R.D. 409, 462 (1971).
15. A federal law enforcement officer or attorney for the government must appear before a
federal magistrate and swear to an affidavit that establishes: (1) that there is probable cause to
believe an offense has been committed; (2) that there are reasonable grounds, not amounting to
probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the person described in the affidavit committed the offense;
and (3) that the results of specific nontestimonial identification procedures will be of material aid in
determining whether the person named in the affidavit committed the offense. Id. at 463.
16. Id. at 466-67.
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proposed rule,17 nine states enacted similar legislation or court rules of
their own 18-most of which would probably allow DNA typing on less
than traditional probable cause.
This Note argues that, by adopting such legislation, Congress and
state legislatures could allow law enforcement authorities to effectively
use DNA typing as an investigatory tool and still preserve individual
fights. First, the Note describes the DNA typing process itself 19 and its
advantages and disadvantages relative to other identification tech-
niques.20 Second, the Note discusses the traditional constitutional limita-
tions on identification techniques, how Davis v. Mississippi and
subsequent decisions may have changed these limitations, and how DNA
typing fit with these limitations.21 Third, the Note discusses the balanc-
ing approach of Proposed Rule 41.1 and similar balancing schemes used
by some states.22 Fourth, the Note argues that DNA typing is particu-
larly well-suited to the balancing approach suggested by Proposed Rule
41.1.23 Finally, the Note proposes that the states and the federal govern-
ment adopt rules like Proposed Rule 41.1, which authorize DNA typing
on less than probable cause and under the supervision of a neutral
magistrate.24
I. THE PROCESS OF DNA TYPING
A. Background.
Genes carry the genetic information found in the cells of individuals
and this genetic information creates an individual's "basic blueprint," de-
termining everything from sex to eye color.25 DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid) is the material of which genes are composed. DNA is present in the
17. United States v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that district court
had no jurisdiction to order inmate to give handwriting exemplar; discussed failure of the proposed
rule in that context), mandate aff'd, opinion withdrawn, 565 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1978).
18. ALASKA R. CT. 16(c)(1)-(2) (1988); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3905 (1978); COLO. R.
CRIM. P. 41.1 (1984); IDAHO CODE § 19-625 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 810.1-.2 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-3301 to -3307 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-271 to -282
(1983); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8-1 to -4 (1982); VT. R. CRIM. P. 41.1 (1983).
19. See infra notes 25-52 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 53-79 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 80-104 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 105-29 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 13542 and accompanying text.
25. See Marshall, supra note 2, at 13, col. 1 ("DNA... [is] found in the chromosomes of all
living beings. Chromosomes contain an individual's basic blueprint, determining everything from
sex to eye color"); White & Greenwood, supra note 4, at 14546 ("Since there are probably between
ten thousand and one hundred thousand genes in humans and about one-third are variable, the
number of possible combinations is inconceivably large. That is why each of us, apart from identical
twins, is genetically unique.").
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genes of virtually every cell of the body in the form of long chains of
nucleotide bases26 twisted into a double-helix structure (resembling a
twisted ladder). The nucleotide bases (A, T, C, and G) bind together in
specific sequences that create the language of the genetic code.27 Each
cell reads only the part of the code necessary to do its job, but every cell
contains the entire code. Thus, DNA typing theoretically can be per-
formed on a sample taken from any cell of the body.28
During the early 1980s, Dr. A. J. Jeffreys of the University of
Leicester developed DNA typing in Great Britain.29 The process cuts
DNA into fragments and allows scientists to compare the fragments ac-
cording to number and size by arranging them into a bar code pattern.30
Because of the unique nature of every individual's DNA, no two individ-
uals should produce identical DNA patterns.31
The first step in the DNA typing process is to extract DNA from a
biological sample.32 A sample may consist of blood, semen, skin, saliva,
or hair roots. 33 Once the DNA is isolated, it is treated with protein mol-
ecules called restriction enzymes that cut it into pieces.34 The enzymes
cut DNA only at very specific points (at specific base sequences) and will
cut the same person's DNA in the same places every time they are ap-
plied. 35 This process thus creates DNA fragments of a characteristic
26. See, eg., Kelly, Rankin & Wink, Method and Application of DNA Fingerprinting: A Guide
for the Non-Scientist, 1987 CRIM. L. REv. 105, 106 (1987) (nucleotide bases are four building blocks
that compose DNA and order in which they occur provides information required to assemble and
regulate construction of the body).
27. Id.; Burk, DNA Fingerprinting: Possibilities and Pitfalls of a New Technique, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 455, 457 (1988).
28. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
29. White & Greenwood, supra note 4, at 145.
30. Id. at 146-47.
31. Id. at 147 ("Because there are so many minisatellites [nucleotide base sequences] and be-
cause not every one is present in every individual, the chances of the 'bar code,' that is the minisatel-
lite profile, of two unrelated individuals being identical is less than one in five thousand million
million.").
32. It may be difficult to extract DNA from a biological sample if moisture or bacteria have
degraded the DNA or if the sample is too small. See Moss, DNA-The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A.
J., May 1, 1988, at 66-67 ("About 50 percent of the rape cases referred to Lifecodes get no results
either because of a small sample size, or because the vaginal swab turned up no semen at all.")
However, scientists claim that if a DNA sample has been altered in any way, it will not produce a
false positive-it will simply fail to form a DNA pattern. See LIFECODES CORP., DNA-PRINT
IDENTIFICATION TEsT 6 (1986).
33. See Burk, supra note 27, at 469 ("In theory, DNA analyzed from any body tissue should
yield a pattern identical to the pattern from any other body tissue."); Moss, supra note 32, at 66.
34. Burk, supra note 27, at 457.
35. Different restriction enzymes "recognize" different base sequences which are scattered at
random in the gene; each enzyme will cut the DNA only at the sequence it recognizes. Therefore, a
specific enzyme will cut a person's DNA into the same pieces every time. Burk, supra note 27, at
457-58.
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number and size for each individual tested.
The fragments are then placed in an agorose gel (which resembles a
slab of gelatin) so that their number and length may be examined. An
electric current is run through the gel in a process called gel electrophor-
esis. 36 Because the fragments have a negative charge, the current causes
them to move through the gel toward the positive electrode.3 7 The frag-
ments move at differing speeds according to their length. The larger
fragments move more slowly and stay near the top of the gel; the smaller
fragments move more quickly and end up toward the bottom of the gel. 38
The fragments thus" arrange themselves throughout the gel according to
size.
Because the gel is difficult to work with, the fragment pattern is then
transferred to a nitrocellulose filter (which looks like a heavy piece of
paper) through a process called "Southern Blotting. ' 39 Once fixed to the
filter, a radioactive "gene probe" is applied to the pattern. The probe
binds only to specific base sequences and thereby "marks" them.4° To
expose the "marks," an X-ray fim is placed on the filter for several
days. 41 The film eventually develops into a picture displaying the
marked sequences as dark bands.42 This pattern of bands, which resem-
bles a supermarket bar code, is a DNA identification print. This print
will be compared to other DNA prints in much the same way finger-
prints are compared for identification. 43 Whereas fingerprints are com-
pared by examining the distinctive pattern formed by the tiny ridges on
the skin of a subject's hand, DNA prints are compared by examining the
distinctive pattern formed by a subject's marked gene fragments. 44
36. Id. at 459.
37. Id.
38. The movement of the fragments through a gel is similar to the movement of a person
carrying a rod through a dense forest. If the rod is a short baton, she may move rapidly. If
the rod is a long pole, however, her movement will be impeded and she will move quite
slowly. By the same principle, short DNA fragments move a greater distance through the
gel matrix; large fragments move more slowly.
Id. at 459-60.
39. Id. at 460 (Southern Blotting transfers fragments in exactly the same positions they occu-
pied in gel).
40. The gene probe seeks out a DNA fragment that carries all or part of its complementary
base sequence and binds to that fragment. The radioactive marker on the probe causes the bound
fragments to light up, allowing their positions to be identified. LIFECODES CORP., supra note 32, at
26-27; Burk, supra note 27, at 460.
41. Burk, supra note 27, at 460.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 463; Kelly, Rankin & Wink, supra note 26, at 108; White & Greenwood, supra note
4, at 147; see also LIFECODES CORP., supra note 32, at 26-27 (semen and blood specimens from same
person will result in same two patterns).
44. See A. MOENSSENs, FINGERPRINTS AND THE LAW 10-24 (1969); W. ScoTT, FINGERPRINT
MECHANIcs: A HANDBOOK, 5-11 (1951) (discussing characteristics or "trademarks" by which fin-
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According to officials at Cellmark Diagnostics, the company which
holds an exclusive North American license to market Jeffreys' technique,
there is only a one in 30 billion chance that any two persons' DNA prints
will match and create a false positive result (except in the case of identi-
cal twins).45 The two other labs in the United States that offer DNA
typing-Lifecodes Corporation (in Tarrytown, New York) and Cetus
Corporation (in Emeryville, California)--claim slightly different rates of
reliability. Lifecodes, which uses a technique very similar to Cellmark,
claims a 99.9 percent probability that biological specimens are derived
from the same person if their two DNA patterns match. 46 Unlike the
other two companies, Cetus does not guarantee that its typing will iden-
tify a suspect with virtual certainty;47 it claims only that "one out of
every several thousand people.., could have left a particular sample."'48
Cetus's techniques, however, can type smaller biological samples than
the other two companies because it uses a technique that "amplifies" the
target DNA by creating numerous copies of it. Theoretically, Cetus can
test a sample as small as a single hair cell,49 and the company has actu-
ally produced a print from a sample as small as 40 sperm heads.50 The
other labs, Cellmark and Lifecodes, require larger samples, such as sev-
eral hundred thousand sperm heads or a well-soaked blood stain the size
of a quarter.5 ' Unfortunately, police are less likely to find samples of this
size at the typical crime scene. Indeed, many Cellmark and Lifecodes
tests have produced inconclusive results because the samples were too
small for their methods to work effectively.52
B. Advantages of DNA Typing.
The primary advantage of DNA typing is its remarkable accuracy
and thus its ability to provide nearly positive identification. This is espe-
cially true of the Cellmark and Lifecodes techniques. Advocates of
DNA typing for criminal investigation claim that it can identify suspects
gerprints are identified); infra notes 57-58, 80 and accompanying text; cf LIFECODES CORP., supra
note 32, at 26-28 (outlining procedure for DNA-PRINT Identification Testing).
45. Marshall, supra note 2, at 13, col. 1; Thompson, DNA Fingerprinting: Who Does It and
How, 8 CALIF. LAW., June 1988, at 41.
46. LIFEcoDEs CORP., supra note 32, at 1.
47. Thompson, supra note 11, at 41.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also Moss, supra note 32, at 66 (spot of dried semen size of nickle is large enough
sample).
52. See Thompson, supra note 45, at 41 (inconclusive results due to low molecular weight of
sample).
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with "virtual certainty. '5 3 DNA typing works much like fingerprinting
and is much more accurate than traditional blood, semen, or hair-typing
tests.
54
DNA typing is also unique because of the range of forensic samples
that it can test.55 Potential samples include blood, semen, hair, and skin
scrapings.56 Police are often more likely to find these kinds of samples at
crime scenes than fingerprints,57 particularly in rape investigations where
s~men samples may be the only available evidence. 58
DNA typing can also be performed on forensic samples that have
dried and aged, whereas traditional lab tests cannot.59 The DNA's struc-
ture is sufficiently hardy so that law enforcement authorities are able to
reopen old cases and compare forensic samples from a number of crimes,
even if the samples have aged substantially, to see whether the same as-
sailant was involved. Successful tests have been performed on samples
up to four years old. 60
In addition, law enforcement authorities could easily computerize
the data from DNA prints because of their bar code structure.61 Finger-
prints have sometimes been computerized, but their structure is too com-
plex to accurately symbolize and efficiently search by computer. 62 In
contrast, DNA prints are easy to symbolize in a numeric form that is
suitable for computer access. 63
53. See Moss, supra note 32, at 66.
54. Cf id. at 66-67 (The traditional HLA (human leukocyte antigen) blood test has an exclu-
sion rating of only 90 to 95 percent (meaning that there is a 90 or 95 percent certainty that any two
matching specimens came from the same person) and, for some common blood types, the exclusion
rating is as low as 50 percent. Traditional hair testing only determines whether hair found at a crime
scene has characteristics such as color and size consistent with those of a suspect.). But see supra
note 16 and accompanying text (Cellmark claims only one in 30 billion matching samples would not
come from same person).
55. LIFECODES CORP., supra note 32, at 7.
56. Moss, supra note 54, at 66.
57. LIFECODES CORP., supra note 32, at 7-8. Fingerprints are often not available at all to aid
police investigations.
In the majority of rapes and in a high percentage of other crimes, investigators are unable
to recover fingerprints, either because the prints are not present or because they have been
left on surfaces that preclude fingerprint analysis. By contrast, it is possible to obtain re-
suits with the DNA-PRINT Identification Test in nearly all cases in which there is suffi-
cient biological evidence from the assailant.
Id.
58. See id. at 8.
59. Moss, supra note 32, at 66.
60. Burk, supra note 27, at 464 ("Success has been reported in fingerprinting DNA from dried
blood and semen samples up to four years old.").
61. See LIFECODES CORP., supra note 32, at 8.
62. Id.; see also Thompson, supra note 45, at 42.
63. California Attorney General John Van de Kamp predicts that within three to five years his
office will have a database of genetic fingerprints on computer. When the system is on-line, local law
Vol. 1989:474]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1989:474
DNA typing can be particularly effective in rape cases. First, it can
be used to test each semen sample of sufficient size.64 Testing techniques
traditionally used in rape investigations identify suspects based on anti-
gens-proteins that are normally present in semen. 65 Nearly twenty per-
cent of all males, however, do not secrete antigens and thus traditional
testing methods cannot identify those males. DNA typing does not have
this limitation, however, because semen will leave DNA prints.
Another advantage in rape cases is that the DNA found in sperm
can be separated from the vaginal cells often mixed with sperm in foren-
sic samples.66 Although this mixing has often thwarted attempts at
traditional testing of semen, it will not hinder DNA typing.67
C. Disadvantages of DNA Typing.
The major disadvantage of DNA typing is that it is "very labour-
intensive and needs both meticulous expertise and much experience in
the reading and interpretation of the bands." 68 The test is also very time
intensive, often requiring several days to complete. 69
As of June 1988, only three private labs in the United States offered
the process for criminal investigations. 70 Some experts are concerned
that these labs have not tested their experimental techniques sufficiently
to support their statistical claims.71 Others are concerned that the profit
motive of these private labs may interfere with the integrity of their test-
enforcement officials say that "most rapists might as well leave calling cards at the scene of their
crime." Thompson, supra note 45, at 42. Van de Kamp also has expressed concern that such a
database may threaten privacy interests. "It is one thing to have fingerprints and criminal histories
accessible to tens of thousands of peace officers.... It is another to have information on-line that
can mark you as a carrier of AIDS, or prove that you are not genetically related to either of your
parents." Moss, supra note 32, at 70. Experts claim, however, that the bar codes contained in such
a database would reveal very little except a suspect's identity. See infra notes 75-77 and accompany-
ing text.
64. Moss, supra note 32, at 66.
65. Id.
66. See Gill, Jeffreys & Werrett, Forensic Application of DNA ingerprints,' 318 NATURE 577
(1985) ("sperm nuclei can be separated from vaginal cellular debris, obtained from semen-contami-
nated vaginal swabs, enabling positive identification of the male donor/suspect").
67. Burk, supra note 27, at 464.
68. White & Greenwood, supra note 4, at 147 (quoting Dodd, DNA Fingerprinting in Matters of
Family and Crime, 26 MED. Sci. & LAW 5 (1986)).
69. Id.
70. Thompson, supra note 45, at 41 (Cellmark Diagnostics in Germantown, Maryland;
Lifecodes Corp. in Tarrytown, New York; and Cetus Corp. in Emeryville, California).
71. Thompson, DNA's Troubled Debut, 8 CALIF. LAW. 36, June 1988, at 36, 44 (statement by
Fredrick Millar, supervising deputy attorney general in San Diego, noting that "private firms for the
most part have not put their technology to the test of independent validation studies").
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ing.72 Increased competition, investigation, and government involvement
should reduce these concerns. For example, at least one other company,
E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., is currently seeking to develop an
alternative technique,73 and the FBI is examining the methods used by
Cellmark, Lifecodes, and Cetus to determine the best method to use in its
own lab.74
Some commentators have noted that as the public becomes aware of
the effectiveness of DNA typing, people will be concerned that authori-
ties will use this technique75 to discover private information concerning
family relationships, susceptibility to disease or mental illness, or level of
intelligence, and not merely the identity of criminals. Advocates of
DNA typing, however, claim that these concerns are largely unfounded
the bar code form of DNA prints reveals virtually no genetic information
contained in a person's DNA. 76 One commentator even stated that "ge-
netic privacy" concerns "would seem to be unwarranted, and probably
deserve minimal court attention. ' 77 A highly trained scientist might
glean from the patterns some information concerning genetic disease, but
this is true of many commonly considered biochemical tests. 78
Finally, the accuracy of DNA typing, like any other forensic test, is
limited by the skills of persons administering the test. Human actors
exercise their judgment in performing and evaluating DNA tests, and
they always remain capable of laboratory error.79 Furthermore, DNA
typing cannot prove that a suspect committed a crime no matter how
accurately it can identify his forensic sample. The presence of a suspect's
forensic sample at the scene of a crime is always open to an innocent
explanation. These criticisms, discounting the predictability of the test,
72. See Thompson, supra note 71, at 44 ("[of] the handful [of DNA researchers] working in
forensics, almost none are law enforcement personnel. They are all attached to private laboratories,
which by the way, have a proprietary interest in their own procedures.") (statement of California
Attorney General John van De Kamp); Burk, supra note 27, at 468 n.60.
73. See, eg., Thompson, supra note 47, at 43 (company currently developing "laser sequenc-
ing" technique).
74. Moss, supra note 32, at 70.
75. See, eg., Burk, supra note 27, at 471 ("In a society concerned with blood tests exposing the
stigma of AIDS, some might fear the ultimate invasion of privacy: examination and exposure of a
person's genetic makeup.").
76. Id. ("patterns created by DNA fingerprinting show nothing concerning a person's intelli-
gence, sex, or outward physical appearance"); see also Marshall, supra note 2, at 13, col. 1 (Dr.
Jeffreys claims DNA fingerprints contain no information regarding sex or even species of donor).
77. Burk, supra note 27, at 471.
78. See id.; cf infra note 35 and accompanying text.
79. See Burk, supra note 27, at 465 ("a degree of human judgment enters the test when the
autoradiographs [bar codes] are interpreted .... The person who determines whether or not a
certain band should be disregarded should have considerable experience in reading
autoradiographs.").
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however, also apply to other commonly used forensic tests and are not
criticisms specific to DNA typing.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON DNA TYPING
DNA typing is analogous to two other nontestimonial identification
techniques: fingerprinting and blood typing. The process is as accurate
and potentially incriminating as fingerprinting,80 and requires no more
intrusion into a suspect's body than blood typing.81 Police must have a
warrant based on probable cause to take either fingerprints or blood sam-
ples when gathering evidence. 82 The Supreme Court has held that both
techniques require probable cause because they fall under the fourth
amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. 83
Historically, the Supreme Court has held that searches and seizures
not based on probable cause are unconstitutional. 84 Within the last
twenty-five years, however, the Court has relaxed this strict interpreta-
tion of the fourth amendment. The two most important cases that indi-
cate a more flexible interpretation are Camara v. Municipal Court 85 and
80. See Moss, supra note 32, at 66 ("[c]ommercial laboratories marketing the tests say their
research shows that DNA typing is as accurate as a fingerprint"); supra notes 45-52 and accompany-
ing text; see also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) ("fingerprinting is an inherently more
reliable and effective crime-solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confessions"); A. MOEN-
SSENs, FINGERPRINTS AND THE LAW 28 (1969) ("Because of the fact that fingerprint technicians
require at least eight matching characteristics in both prints and no unexplained points of difference,
it may be said safely that even though an art is involved, different experts would nevertheless come to
the same conclusion of identity with respect to a given latent and inked print .... The certainty
inherent in this process of comparison accounts for the fact that, in the area of fingerprint evidence,
there is seldom a battle of opposing experts.").
81. See Burk, supra note 27, at 470 ("Samples for DNA fingerprinting may also be obtained
from sources such as hair roots or skin scrapings; these might be viewed as even less intrusive than
blood sampling."); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) ("[S]uch tests [i.e.,
blood tests] are a commonplace in these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with
them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and that for most people the procedure
involves virtually no risk, trauma, or pain.").
82. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
83. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. at 727 (fingerprinting); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
at 770 (blood samples).
84. See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100, 102 (1959) ("The requirement of probable
cause has roots that are deep in our history.... It is important, we think, that this requirement be
strictly enforced, for the standard set by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen. If
the officer acts with probable cause, he is protected even though it turns out that the citizen is
innocent.... And while a search without a warrant is, within limits, permissible if incident to a
lawful arrest, if an arrest without a warrant is to support an incidental search, it must be made with
probable cause."); supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S.
573, 577 (1971) (Court examined the showing of probable cause in order to evaluate compliance with
the fourth amendment); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478 (1963) (opinion focused on
whether arrests met the probable cause standard prescribed by the fourth amendment, finding that
reliance on unfamiliar informants and uncorroborated admissions of the accused were insufficient).
85. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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Terry v. Ohio. 86 The Camara case addressed the question of whether the
inspection of dwellings for health and fire prevention purposes was an
"unreasonable" search and seizure under the fourth amendment such
that law enforcement officials would need warrants based on probable
cause. To answer this question, the Court formulated a "balancing test"
for search and seizure.8 7 In formulating this test, the Court narrowed the
range of searches and seizures considered "unreasonable" under the
fourth amendment, while acknowledging that there is "no ready test for
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails."'88 To properly balance
these interests, the Court declared that it was necessary "first to focus
upon the governmental interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion
upon the constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen."8 9
The Court then concluded that to require probable cause to make health
and fire inspections frustrates administration of these inspections, 90 and
that the inspections themselves are reasonable searches of private prop-
erty. The Court rested its conclusion on the history of both judicial and
public acceptance of area inspections, the lack of administratively feasi-
ble alternatives, and the limited degree to which such inspections invade
a citizen's privacy. 91
The Court also applied the balancing test in Terry v. Ohio.92 It bal-
anced governmental interests against individual interests to determine if
a police force's "stop and frisk" procedure, in which officers searched
suspects without warrants, was "reasonable" under the fourth amend-
ment. 93 The Court concluded that society's interest in preventing crime
and protecting police officers outweighs an individual's interest in avoid-
ing the minor interferences with personal liberty that a "stop and frisk"
procedure imposed.94 The Court based its conclusion on the importance
of the government's interest in investigating crime,95 law enforcement
officers' need to protect themselves,96 and the limited extent to which the
"stop and frisk" procedure invaded a citizen's privacy.97
86. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
87. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37; Comment, Detention for Taking Physical Evidence Without
Probable Cause, 14 ARIz. L. REv. 132, 138 (1972).
88. Camara, 387 U.S. at 536-37; see also Comment, supra note 87, at 138..
89. Id. at 534-35.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 537.
92. 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
93. See id. at 20-21; Comment, supra note 87, at 138.
94. Id. at 22, 27, 29-30; see also Comment, supra note 87, at 138-39.
95. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
96. Id. at 24.
97. Id. at 24-25.
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In another case, Davis v. Mississippi, 98 the Court applied the balanc-
ing test to pre-arrest identification procedures with the opposite result.
The Court concluded that government interests did not justify the pro-
longed detention of several rape suspects for fingerprinting and question-
ing for less than probable cause. Nevertheless, it also recognized in dicta
that there may be times when, "because of the unique nature of the fin-
gerprinting process, ... detentions [for fingerprinting] might, under nar-
rowly defined circumstances, be found to comply with the Fourth
Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the traditional
sense." 99 Because DNA typing exhibits the same "unique nature" that
made the Court look favorably upon fingerprinting, the fourth amend-
ment balancing test arguably could permit DNA typing on less than
probable cause.
In Davis, the Court detailed the unique nature of fingerprinting and
its implications on a person's privacy:
Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intru-
sion upon personal security than other types of police searches and
detentions. Fingerprinting involves none of the probing into an indi-
vidual's private life and thoughts that marks an interrogation or
search. Nor can fingerprint detention be employed repeatedly to har-
ass any individual, since the police need only one set of each person's
prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is an inherently more reliable and
effective crime solving tool than eyewitness identifications or confes-
sions and is not subject to such abuses as improper line-up and "third
degree." Finally, because there is no danger of destruction of finger-
prints, the limited detention need not come unexpectedly or at an in-
convenient time. 10
Because DNA typing has each of the qualities that the Davis court
attributed to fingerprinting,10 1 the Davis dicta suggests that the fourth
amendment would allow DNA typing on less than probable cause
"under narrowly defined circumstances." However, one important dif-
ference between DNA typing and fingerprinting remains. DNA typing
requires a sample of blood, saliva, skin, semen, or hair, and fingerprinting
does not. Obtaining these samples may involve a greater intrusion in a
person's privacy than taking ink prints of the surface of suspects' fingers.
In this regard, DNA typing would more closely resemble blood typing
than fingerprinting.
In 1966, the Supreme Court decided Schmerber v. California, the
98. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
99. Id. at 727. The Court failed to elaborate on what "narrowly defined circumstances" may
be. See id. at 727.
100. Id.
101. See infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text.
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leading case on taking blood samples for evidence.10 2 In evaluating a
California procedure whereby police tested blood-alcohol levels without
probable cause, the Schmerber Court ruled that law enforcement officials
need search warrants to intrude into a person's body for evidence. The
Court, however, did hint at the balancing test that it would articulate
several years later in Camera and Terry. Stating that the "Fourth
Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions
as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circum-
stances, or which are made in an improper manner,"103 the Court found
nothing inherently unreasonable about physicians taking blood samples
for law enforcement personnel "in a hospital environment according to
acceptable medical practices."' 1 4 The Court emphasized that "for most
people the procedure involves virtually no risk, trauma or pain." 10 5
Indeed, DNA typing can easily accommodate those suspects for
whom blood testing involves substantial risk, trauma, or pain. Because
of DNA typing's flexibility, suspects may provide hair, skin, or saliva
samples for typing as alternatives to blood samples. These alternative
samples require no intrusions into a suspect's body nor even require med-
ical supervision.
III. BALANCING APPROACH OF PROPOSED RULE 41.1 AND OTHER
STATE RULES
In response to the dictum in Davis, the Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference proposed a new Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure: Rule 41.1 on Nontestimonial Identifica-
tion.106 The Rule authorizes federal magistrates, upon the request of a
federal law enforcement officer or government attorney, to issue orders
that require an individual suspected of committing an offense 0 7 punish-
able by more than one year in prison, to submit to certain identification
procedures.108 The procedures include: "identification by fingerprints,
palm prints, footprints, measurements, blood specimens, urine speci-
102. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
103. Id. at 768.
104. Id. at 771.
105. Id.
106. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 14, at 462; see also MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT P. Art. 170 (1975) (Proposed Official Draft) (adopted by the Ameri-
can Law Institute May 20, 1975); UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 436 (1974) (proposed by National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform Law); STANDARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE
BEFORE TRIAL 34 (1970) (proposed by American Bar Association); S. 2997, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
115 CONG. REc. 28,896-900 (1969) (proposed Senate bill).
107. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 14, at 463.
108. Id. at 466.
Vol. 1989:474]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
mens, saliva samples, hair samples, or other reasonable physical or medi-
cal examination, handwriting exemplars, voice samples, photographs,
and lineups."' 0 9 To obtain such an order, a federal law enforcement of-
ficer or a government attorney must appear before a federal magistrate
and swear to an affidavit that establishes: (1) there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed; (2) there are reasonable
grounds, though not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect
that the person named or described in the affidavit committed the of-
fense; and (3) the results of specific nontestimonial identification proce-
dures will be of material aid in determining whether the person named in
the affidavit committed the offense.110 Following the lead of the Davis
dictum, this procedure attempts to balance the government's interest in
effective investigatory techniques with the individual's right to protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures. A federal magistrate must im-
partially examine all evidence in a given case and can allow police to use
the specified nontestimonial identification techniques only if the use of
such techniques comports with a balance of interests.
In addition, the proposed Rule prescribes the contents of the magis-
trate's orders to ensure that individual suspects receive the benefit of full
disclosure of the scope and techniques of the procedure. According to
the Rule, an order must state:
(1) that the presence of the person named in the affidavit is required
for the purpose of permitting nontestimonial identification procedures
in order to aid in the investigation of the offense specified therein; (2)
the time and place of the required appearance; (3) the nontestimonial
identification procedures to be conducted, the methods to be used, and
the approximate length of time such procedures will require; (4) the
grounds to suspect that the person named in the affidavit committed
the offense specified therein; (5) that the person will be under no legal
obligation to submit to any interrogation or to make any statement
during the period of his appearance except for that required for voice
identification; (6) that the person may request the federal magistrate to
make a reasonable modification of the order with respect to time and
place of appearance, including a request to have any nontestimonial
identification procedure other than a lineup conducted at his place of
residence; and (7) that the person, if he fails to appear, may be held in
contempt of court."'
The proposed Rule also protects individuals by requiring authorities
to conduct all blood tests under medical supervision. 1 2 Furthermore,
unless authorities arrest someone, the Rule prohibits them from detain-
109. Id. at 466-67.
110. Id. at 463.
111. Id. at 464-65.
112. Id. at 465.
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ing that person under a magistrate's order for longer than is reasonably
necessary to conduct the test. 113 Finally, if, after the authorities con-
clude identification procedures, they still lack probable cause to believe
that a suspect committed an offense, the Rule entitles the suspect to bring
a motion requesting the magistrate to issue an order that directs the au-
thorities to destroy all products and copies of the products obtained from
the identification procedures.' 4
The American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform Law, and the American Bar Association also have
proposed schemes resembling Rule 41. 1,115 and, in 1969, the Senate con-
sidered a bill containing provisions similar to Rule 41.1.116 The Senate
bill did not survive committee, however, and the Judicial Conference
never adopted Proposed Rule 41.1.117 The Conference rejected the Rule
partly because "[t]he committees and the Conference should have the
benefit of more experience with such procedure in the states and in the
District of Columbia and of judicial consideration of the constitutional
question involved."''11
Since that time, nine states have enacted statutes or court rules that
contain provisions similar to those in Rule 41.1: Alaska, Arizona, Colo-
rado, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, North Carolina, Utah, and Vermont. 119
Only three of these schemes have faced direct constitutional challenge;
two courts upheld the constitutionality of the schemes and the other
court interpreted the statute to require probable cause.
In one of these constitutional challenges, People v. Madson, 120 the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld Colorado's court rule authorizing non-
testimonial identification procedures on less than probable cause. The
Colorado Rule allows magistrates to issue nontestimonial identification
orders if the police provide evidence by affidavits that establish: (1) prob-
able cause to believe a crime has been committed; and (2) reasonable
grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect that the
113. Id.
114. Id. at 466.
115. See supra note 105.
116. S. 2997, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 28,896-900 (1969).
117. United States v. Holland, 552 F.2d 667, 673-74 (5th Cir. 1977) ("bill was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary and was never heard of again, apparently dying in Committee"), man-
date aff'd, opinion withdrawn, 565 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1978).
118. Id. at 674.
119. ALASKA R. CT. 16(c)(1)-(2) (1988); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 13-3905 (1978); COLO. R.
CRIM. P. 41.1 (1984); IDAHO CODE ANN. 19-625 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. 810.1-.2 (West 1978 &
Supp. 1988); NEB. REV. STAT. 29-3301 to -3307 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1SA-271 to -282
(1983); UTAH CODE ANN. 77-8-1 to -4 (1982); VT. R. CRIM. P. 41.1 (1983).
120. 638 P.2d 18 (Colo. 1981).
Vol. 1989:474]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
person described in the affidavit committed the offense. 121 In the opin-
ion, the court also noted that the Rule complies with conditions that the
Supreme Court established in cases like Terry:
These cases suggest that limited intrusions into privacy on less than
probable cause are reconcilable with Fourth Amendment guarantees
when the following conditions exist. First, there must be an articulable
and specific basis in fact for suspecting criminal activity at the outset.
Second, the intrusion must be limited in scope, purpose and duration.
Third, the intrusion must be justified by substantial law enforcement
interests. Last, there must be an opportunity at some point to subject
the intrusion to the neutral and detached scrutiny of a judicial officer
before the evidence obtained therefrom may be admitted in a criminal
proceeding against the accused.122
Applying these criteria, the court refused to overturn a murder con-
viction based on evidence that included a photograph and handwriting
exemplar obtained before arrest pursuant to Colorado's Rule 41.1.123 In
arriving at this decision, the court clearly administered a Davis-like bal-
ancing formula to uphold the Rule.
Similarly, in State v. Grgalva, 124 the Arizona Supreme Court upheld
a statute that allows temporary pre-arrest detention to obtain evidence of
identifying physical characteristics on less than probable cause. Pursu-
ant to a pre-arrest detention order, the police obtained photographs of
the defendant, his fingerprints, and six hairs from his head. 25 When the
defendant moved to suppress the evidence, the trial court denied the mo-
tion. On appeal, the court upheld the use of that evidence, as well as the
constitutionality of the Arizona statute. The court declared that a "tem-
porary detention order is not.., of the stature of a warrant necessitating
probable cause.... [A]n arrest is a uniquely harsh restriction of liberty
with severe consequences for the one arrested; a detention for no more
than three hours is a significantly lesser invasion."' 126 The court also em-
phasized that "the interest of society in the investigation of felonies is
very high and the statute requires that it must be otherwise impossible to
obtain the necessary identification evidence except in this manner."' 127
According to the court, obtaining photographs or hair clippings involved
a relatively small invasion of a person's privacy:
The degree of intrusion into the person's privacy is relatively slight.
Photographs, more so than fingerprints, involve none of the probing
121. 638 P.2d at 32.
122. Id. at 31-32.
123. Id. at 22-23.
124. 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 873 (1975).
125. Grjalva, I11 Ariz. at 477, 533 P.2d at 534.
126. 111 Ariz. at 478, 533 P.2d at 535.
127. 111 Ariz. at 479, 533 P.2d at.536.
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that the Davis court found to mark a search of an unreasonable nature.
Similarly, clipping several head hairs is only the slightest intrusion
upon the body, if any at all, and does not constitute anything
unreasonable. 128
Unlike Madson and Grjalva, however, the Nebraska Supreme
Court in State v. Evans read the Nebraska scheme for identifying physi-
cal characteristics to require that police show both probable cause to be-
lieve that (1) a crime has been committed and (2) the person compelled
to submit to nontestimonial identification procedures committed the
crime.129 The statute itself did not specifically require the second part of
the test; rather it required only the following:
(1) there is probable cause to believe that an offense has been commit-
ted; (2) that procurement of evidence of identifying physical character-
istics through nontestimonial identification procedures . . . may
contribute to the identification of the individual who committed such
offense; and (3) that the identified or described individual has refused,
or there is reason to believe he will refuse, to voluntarily provide the
desired evidence of identifying physical characteristics."' 130
Relying on the legislature's decision not to specifically enact a "reason-
able grounds to suspect" standard like that in Rule 41.1, the Nebraska
court interpreted its statute to incorporate a traditional standard of prob-
able cause.
No federal court has reviewed the constitutionality of any of the
state statutes modeled after Rule 41.1, and no state court has ruled that
its state statute is unconstitutional. Thus a number of states such as Col-
orado, Arizona, and Nebraska have gained experience in administering
schemes for nontestimonial identification, as the Judicial Conference sug-
gested. Their experience has shown that rules balancing government in-
terests with individuals' fourth amendment privacy rights like Rule 41.1
work in fairly administering such procedures for nontestimonial iden-
tification.
IV. ADAPTING RULE 41.1 TO DNA TYPING
Not only does Rule 41.1 work on its own terms incorporating nu-
merous types of nontestimonial identification, but it also readily accom-
modates the use of DNA typing as an investigatory tool. Moreover,
DNA typing is well suited to the balancing approach suggested by the
Davis dictum and embodied in Proposed Rule 41.1. First, like finger-
128. Id.; see also Note, supra note 11, at 518 (discussing Supreme Court's failure to take consis-
tent position on whether Terry balancing test applies to all police intrusions that do not constitute
full search and seizure or only if police practice is within the Terry exception).
129. 215 Neb. 433, 442, 338 N.W.2d 788, 794 (1983).
130. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3303 (1983).
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printing, DNA typing is an "inherently... reliable and effective crime
solving tool.' 1 31 The state therefore has a strong interest in allowing its
use on less than probable cause. The state interest in DNA typing may
even be stronger than its interest in fingerprinting because police often
discover forensic samples containing DNA at crime scenes where they
are unable to recover clean fingerprints. 132
Second, there is little possibility that law enforcement authorities
will use DNA typing to harass individuals and thereby prejudice their
privacy interests. If a suspect objects to blood testing, investigators can
obtain DNA samples less intrusively from skin or hair roots. In addi-
tion, officials only need to take a DNA sample once, and, because a sus-
pect cannot alter his DNA structure, officials and the suspect can
schedule testing at a convenient time after a magistrate reviews the appli-
cation. Furthermore, authorities can take a sample for testing quickly,
under medical supervision, and with minimal disruption of a suspect's
daily life. Finally, because the typing process is still fairly expensive and
labor intensive,' 33 officials have an incentive not to overuse it.
Third, Rule 41.1 even protects suspects' privacy concerns to a cer-
tain degree. DNA typing results in a bar code, which, according to ex-
perts, reveals very little beyond a suspect's identity. 34 If a suspect's
print does not match the forensic sample, under Rule 41.1, the suspect
also can petition to have the sample and all related records destroyed. 35
This protective measure prevents authorities from placing the DNA
prints of exculpated suspects into a large computer database, as is done
for fingerprinting, for use in later investigations or other more objectiona-
ble purposes. Furthermore, if the state destroys all records of an excul-
pated suspect's DNA test, no social stigma will follow that suspect; the
public will never know that the authorities tested an exculpated suspect.
V. PROPOSAL FOR A DNA TYPING RULE
In order to balance government's interest in crime solution with in-
dividuals' fourth amendment rights, the states and the federal govern-
ment should adopt a rule like Proposed Rule 41.1 that deals specifically
with DNA typing. Lawmakers could even further tailor Rule 41.1 to
satisfy the concerns of individual citizens about DNA typing.
131. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969); see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
132. See LIFECODES CORP., supra note 32, at 7-8.
133. White & Greenwood, supra note 4, at 147.
134. See Burk, supra note 27, at 471.
135. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 14, at 466.
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A better rule than Rule 41.1 would require law enforcement author-
ities to automatically destroy all tests and related records of nonmatching
suspects' after the completion of the tests. 136 The state thus would bear
the burden of proof on the issue of destruction. In light of genetic pri-
vacy concerns, 137 the state clearly lacks sufficient interest in retaining
DNA prints of exculpated suspects. Furthermore, automatic destruction
will satisfy critics' concerns by preventing the state from creating a DNA
computer database containing confidential genetic information. 138
The new rule regulating DNA typing also should expressly prohibit
any form of interrogation during a suspect's brief detention for testing. 139
The current rule only provides that "the person will be under no legal
obligation to submit to any interrogation."'140 The rule should leave no
temptation for the police to question or harass suspects and this formula-
tion leaves room for abuse.
To further guard against personal harassment, the rule also should
allow suspects to have counsel present during testing.141 While the test-
ing procedure stops short of actual arrest, the suspect undergoing testing
still should have access to legal assistance to inform them of their legal
rights. This safeguard also will help ensure that authorities do not use
the procedure for interrogation purposes or detain suspects for longer
than necessary.
To help guard against social stigma associated with the procedure,
the rule should require authorities to perform all testing in a hospital or
other medical facility, rather than at a police station. Such a requirement
also ensures that authorities will perform testing under medical supervi-
sion and will use proper procedures. For the same reasons, the rule
should permit suspects to appear at typing locations voluntarily, rather
than by police escort. 142
Finally, the new rule should expressly provide for an expedited ap-
peal process, whereby suspects could preemptively challenge testing
orders. 143 Such a process would allow suspects to submit evidence to
show that DNA typing would be unreasonable under their particular
circumstances.
136. See Note, supra note 11, at 741.
137. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
139. See Note, supra note 6, at 738-39 (proposing that suspects receive Miranda warnings).
140. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, supra note 14, at 465.
141. See Comment, supra note 87, at 154-56.
142. See id. at 140 n.47.
143. See Note, supra note 6, at 734-36.
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VI. CONCLUSION
By enacting a rule for DNA typing modeled on Proposed Rule 41.1,
the states and the federal government can balance the competing inter-
ests implicated by this new crime-solving technique. Such a rule would
authorize the state to use DNA typing in compelling situations, but also
would protect suspects from unreasonable uses of the process. While au-
thorities have yet to routinely use DNA typing in crime investigation,144
as the technology develops and authorities gain more experience with it,
DNA typing is certain to become a major force in crime solution. The
proposed rule, modeled on Rule 41.1, offers the best way to use this new
investigatory tool because it neither prejudices individual rights nor
shackles law enforcement officials.
Clare M. Tande
144. See Thompson, supra note 45, at 42 (approximately "six states' prosecutors have used ge-
netic fingerprinting evidence at trial).
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